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USING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO
INFORM DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION ANALYSES
Gordon A. Christenson*
Gordon A. Christenson has been Nippert Professor of Law and Dean of the
College of Law at the University of Cincinnati since 1979. While active in the
areas of international law, constitutional law, science and public law, and
legal education, he is writing here as a constitutional lawyer. His special
interests in constitutional law and international law began when he was
studying for his S.J.D. at The George Washington University under James
Oliver Murdock, who introduced him to the concept of the rights of the
individual in international law. Those interests are reflected in his numerous
scholarly publications and in the establishment of the Urban Morgan Institute
for Human Rights at the University of Cincinnati College of Law. This Article
is an expanded version of a paper the Dean presented at the Midwestern
Constitutional Law Professor's Conference, University of Dayton, April 2-3,
1982.
I. INTRODUCTION
Short of natural law or an unwritten constitution, I have heard no
principled explanation to justify the full sweep of judicially-imposed
limits on majoritarian legislation under the written Constitution.' The
purpose of this Article is to argue that explanations of Bill of Rights
limitations in the United States Constitution may be informed or
illuminated by external sources of law that include emerging human
rights norms. 2 While ambitious, this thesis may be sustained by exam-
* The author wishes to give proper credit to Frederick Woodbridge, Jr., who assisted him
in preparing this Article.
1. While there are principled limits to the process of judicial review outside the written
Constitution-stare decisis, common law reasoning, inherent judicial power, the requirement of
cases or controversies-these judicially imposed limits on legislation operate through the open-
ness of the due process clauses, even if their external sources are custom and tradition, backed by
moral reasoning. For a review of this problem in light of recent controversy, see Brest, The
Fundamental Rights of Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional
Law Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981). For an earlier attempt at reconciliation, see E.
BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 347-56 (1962).
The judicial construction of substantive limits on legislation through one of the enumerated
rights in our Constitution requires similar, even less acceptable, use of sources external to the
document. To shape an adequate theory of substantive limits to the power of governments-
whether interpretist or non-interpretist, whether based on substantive due process, the first
amendment, strict or deferential scrutiny, enumerated or unenumerated rights, or fundamental
rights-modern courts in the process of constitutional adjudication must go beyond the text of
the Constitution and examine the context of the particular governmental power and limitations
to that power, using objective normative theory, conscious value preference or some other theory
of interpretation that allows nonformal sources.
2. See generally Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting International Human
Rights Norms, 24 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 153 (1978); see also Rubin, U.S. Tort Suits by Aliens
3
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ining specific "windows" of various open-ended provisions of the Con-
stitution. 3 I focus here on the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and
more particularly on the due process and equal protection standards
of scrutiny of legislation and the underlying principles for scrutinizing
both national and state action. 4 Human rights norms5 are useful as
positive sources for appraising those levels of scrutiny.
The use of human rights norms to aid in interpreting and applying
constitutional limitations in questions involving rights similar to those
protected under the Bill of Rights "informs" or illuminates the mean-
ing of the limitation in a broader context than purely domestic. Hu-
man rights norms are a positive source of law external to the text of
the Bill of Rights or cases interpreting it. External sources6 such as
international law are not evidence of autonomous rules or authorities
Based on International Law, INT'L PRAc. NOTEBOOK, Jan. 1983, at 19 (underscoring difficulties
of determining the content and exact scope of international law norms applied to individuals).
I do not wish to engage here in a critique of the contributions of Brest, Choper, Ely, Perry,
Tribe or Tushnet, among others. There is little emphasis in their theories on the use of external
sources of positive law. See P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION
MAKING, CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1983); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980);
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1978); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
3. "Open-ended provisions" refers to those provisions of the Constitution "that are difficult
to read responsibly as anything other than quite broad invitations to import into the constitu-
tional decision process considerations that will not be found in the language of the amendment or
the debates that led up to it." J. ELY, supra note 2, at 14. Examples are the first, ninth and
fourteenth amendments, and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in the eighth
amendment.
4. This particular focus has been chosen because courts have combined the concepts of
equal protection and due process with some confusion. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88, 119 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Court . . . inexplicably melds together the concepts
of equal protection and procedural and substantive due process .... ").
5. The term "human rights norm" is used to mean those fundamental rights of individuals
or groups that are expressed as valid claims against any state and that serve to guide official
action under international obligations owed by all states. As they emerge, these rights are
determined to exist by reference to traditional, positive sources of international law. For a
discussion of the sources of international law, see J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM ch. 2 (2d ed. 1981); and L. HENKIN, R. PUGH,
0. SCHACTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 2 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as INTERNATIONAL LAW]. See also infra notes 62 & 63.
6. The term "external sources" includes custom, practice, treaties and general expectations
created by civilized states. Those sources of law may be found in subsidiary evidence such as
writings of distinguished jurists, the foreign relations practice of the states, decisions of domestic
courts and international tribunals, domestic laws common to all civilized nations and the
practice of various international organizations. This Article will not address treaties and their
application with respect to constitutional interpretation, since very few human rights conven-
tions have been ratified by the United States.
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that limit federal or state power under federal common law, 7 al-
though such an argument has indeed been advanced.8 Rather, such
external sources form part of a universal context in which a right,
because it is juridically shaped from these sources, assumes impor-
tance in interpreting a limitation in the Bill of Rights, or in other
constitutional provisions designed to protect individual rights, in ways
that avoid unnecessary conflict with a state's obligations to the inter-
national community.
At the outset I am curious why our courts shun external sources of
law-more specifically, contemporary decisions of foreign and inter-
national courts-and seldom consider other external sources such as
custom. Occasionally state courts, federal district courts and courts of
appeals refer to such sources of law, as in cases involving illegal aliens,
minimum standards for prisoners, arbitrary detention and torture.,
Too often, however, critics argue out-of-hand that human rights law
and international law do not exist because they cannot be enforced.10
Those arguments make an intellectual leap that denies to interna-
tional and human rights law any status as external sources of law for
purposes of constitutional interpretation. Custom suffers a similar fate
formally, but less so in practice. That refusal seems greater now than
at any time since the Founders accepted the law of nations. Never-
theless, as D'Amato's argument explains, human rights law is a part of
international law that is enforced by reciprocal sanctions by states.'
2
Human rights law may be used to express the larger community's
7. See Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 4 Hous. J. INT'a L. 39, 40 (1981) (claim that human rights provisions of international
instruments are part of federal common law is overbroad and aspirational).
8. See I THE LAW GROUP DocKEr 7 (1981) (published by the International Human Rights
Law Group) (claiming that "[tihe effect of [Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)]
is to direct American lawyers and judges to international sources of the rights of litigants."); see
also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REvISED) ch. 2
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1980).
9. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (various interna-
tional instruments concerning torture cited as evidence that freedom from torture is basic right
under customary international law); Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S.
Ct. 2382 (1982) (article 45 of Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S.
No. 6847, cited with respect to providing education for children); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505
F. Supp. 787, 795, (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Ameri-
can Declaration of Human Rights cited with respect to problem of alleged arbitrary detention.);
Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, -, 625 P.2d 123, 131 (1982) (court referred to international
standards for treatment of prisoners).
10. See Note, 33 STAN. L. REV. 353, 358 (1981) ("International human rights law is generally
only normative; it rarely provides enforcement procedures or rights of action.").
11. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 459 n.59 (1972).
12. D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110
(1982).
1983]
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expectations even between a country and its own nationals, that
relationship being a juridical construct of international law that may
be reflected in domestic constitutional law.
II. PRELIMINARY PARADOXES: THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT
The most creative recent scholarship in constitutional theory offers
scant attention to the international context in which our written
constitution evolves internally. In reflecting on this problem, let us
consider some obvious paradoxes. These paradoxes appear in many
guises in interpreting ambiguous or general language in our Constitu-
tion and might provide understanding of the argument for the use of
human rights norms.
A. Judicial Provincialism
While modern telecommunications make us aware of global inter-
dependence with respect to almost every aspect of our daily lives, most
United States courts, both state and federal, show less inclination now
than at the beginning of the Republic to use sources of foreign,
international and customary law to aid interpretation, especially in
constitutional cases, and thereby link particular cases with a broader
context. The paradox is that while court-cited provincial (their own)
sources of law lead us to become juridically isolated, our perceptions
refer nonetheless to the interconnectedness of global reality as justifi-
cation for universal norms outlawing torture, preventing arbitrary
arrest and detention, and condemning terrorism and gross violations
of human rights. We are outraged when these norms are violated. Our
present solution to this paradox is deference to the national policy and
foreign affairs powers of the political branches. Unfortunately, this
deference by necessity implies encroachment on the judicial protection
of certain private rights, as we saw in the Iranian Assets case13 or in
the Agee case curtailing travel abroad.' 4 The contradiction is that as
international reality is accommodated consciously by judicial defer-
ence, judicial doctrine protecting individuals has turned inward to
discount the international reality of developing human rights.1
5
13. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
14. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
15. The late Professor Karl Llewellyn, in a realistically refreshing essay, called it "extraordi-
nary" that "the primary source of information as to what our Constitution comes to, is the
language of a certain Document of 1789, together with a severely select coterie of additional
paragraphs called Amendments." His astonishment at American provincialism, seen in the
anachronism of applying language "framed to start a governmental experiment for an agricul-
[Vol. 52
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B. The Problem of Unenumerated Rights
In constitutional interpretation a second paradox occurs. The
Founders constructed our social contract using theories, such as those
of Locke and Rousseau,' based on inalienable or natural rights hav-
ing no territorial confines and depending for their existence on no
written constitution. 7 Our present-day polity, however, with its skep-
tical and positivist attitude, accepts only the language of the Constitu-
tion in its context or Supreme Court decisions as sources of constitu-
tional limitations.' 8 Yet the "living Constitution" changes with
external conditions not within the context of the written constitu-
tion. 1 This historical growth leads to the paradox of unenumerated
rights.
The modern confusion about the expression "unenumerated
rights"20 may be clarified only in part by referring to the Founders' use
of rights as political: political claims to rights surely can be enacted
into positive legal rights. But are all unenumerated rights purely
political? If so, as Ely points out, how do we account for the ninth
amendment?2' Short of a natural law theory of how "to find" and give
tural, sectional seaboard folk of some three millions," would probably be even greater in today's
interdependent world than it was in 1934. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34
COLUM. L. REV. 2, 3 (1934).
16. For an assessment of the influence Locke's and Rousseau's "contract" theories had on the
Founders, see E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 1, at 49-57 (1962), and C. WOOD, CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 260-65, 282-91 (1969).
17. See J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RICHTS (1980), for a modern theory of
natural law that, in the Thomistic tradition, derives positive law from natural law and offers a
framework to guard against pure subjectivism.
18. See generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L.
REV. 204, 204 n.1 (1980) (author's "originalism" and Ely's "interpretivism" accord binding
authority to constitutional text or intention of the Founders).
19. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 707-08
(1975):
In the important cases, reference to analysis of the constitutional text plays a minor
role. The dominant norms of decision are those large conceptions of governmental
structure and individual rights that are best referred to, and whose content is scarcely at
all specified, in the written Constitution-dual federalism, vested rights, fair proce-
dure, equality before the law.
For an application of "nonformal sources" of law to constitutional interpretation, see E. Bo-
DENHEIMER, supra note 1, at 292-324, 347-56.
20. How can meaning be given to an unenumerated right if there are no sources other than
the text from which the right may be derived?
21. This "scary" amendment, to use Ely's word (J. ELY, supra note 2, at 34-41), plainly
seems to be more than a rule of construction. Yet although hundreds of federal district court cases
have cited the ninth amendment (most of them negatively or half-heartedly), only two Supreme
Court cases have done so recently. The first, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), was
a disaster for the ninth. Justice Goldberg's concurrence, purportedly based on the ninth but in
effect invoking natural law, made it easy to discount further use of the lost amendment. See
1983]
HeinOnline  -- 52 U. Cin. L. Rev. 7 1983
   7 
  erated ts 
l t tion   
 te   t ,  
 ,16   l 
 t ri l     
 titutionY   , ,  
  t     
t  t  
 . IS  ti "   
l  t    -
19      
 
   t   rated 
ts"20  i     '  
  l t d 
   ted   
i l     t   
d ent?21       
tural, sectional sea ar  f l  f s  t r  illi s," l  r l)(   t  i  t '  
interdependent orld t a  it as in . le ell ,  stit ti  s  I tit ti ,  
. . . 
16. For an assess ent of the influence ocke's a  ssea 's " tr t" t ri s   t  
ers, see . I , s r  t  I, t -  ( ),  G. , I    
I   , . 
17. See J. FI IS, T L    IG  ( ), f r  r  t r  f 
natural la  that, in the Tho istic tradition, derives positive la  fro  at ral la  a  ff rs  
fra e ork t  ar  i st r  j ti i . 
18. See generally rest, he isc ceive  est f r t e ri i al rstanding,  . V. . 
E . 204, 204 .l (1980) (a t r's " ri i alis " a  l 's "i t r r tivis " r  i i  
authority to c stit ti al t t r i t ti  f t  rs). 
19. See rey, o e ave an n ritten onstitution?, 27 S . . . , -  
 
In the i portant cases, reference to analysis of the constitutional text plays a inor 
role. The do inant nor s of decision are those large conceptions of govern ental 
structure and individual ri ts t at are est referre  t ,   t t i  r l  t 
ll ifi , i  t  ritt  tit ti -dual lis ,  , 
dure, e ality ef re t  l . 
For an application of "nonfor al sources" of la  to constitutional i ter retati , see . -
I R,  t  ,  , . 
20. o  can eaning be given to an unenu erated right if there are  s rces t r t  
t  t t      
. is "scar " a e ent, t  s  l '  r  a. , ra t  , t ),  
see s t  e r  t   r l  f str tion. t lt  s  l i t i t   
have cited the ninth a end ent ( ost of the  negatively or half-heartedly), l  t  re e 
ourt cases have done so recently. he first, ris old . ectic t,  V. .  ( ), s 
a disaster f r t e i t . J sti  l r 's rr ce, r rt l    t  i t  t i  
effect i i  t r l l ,  it s  t  i t t    t  l t t.  
CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
protection to those unenumerated rights, however, we are left with
only textually enumerated rights as positive limits on power, 22 unless
some other principled means is found to prevent delegated powers
from crowding out all unenumerated rights. This textual interpreta-
tion seems to contradict the plain meaning of the ninth amendment,
and Madison's intended result, that unenumerated rights be neither
denied nor disparaged.
C. Radical Individual Autonomy vs. The Need for Cooperation
A third paradox, especially apparent within the United States, helps
to explain the present friction between individuals and the collective
majority.2 3 I am referring to the radicalization of individual auton-
omy. Judicial protection of individual autonomy, however, has been
accompanied by a simultaneous increase in cooperative activity
through collective law and regulation, made necessary for the com-
mon good by the interdependence of individuals.
The experience with which Choper, Ely and Tribe have worked
springs from this apparent contradiction between radical individual
autonomy, which is sheltered by judicial activism, and democratic
theory, which seeks to provide a social fabric or framework within
which "atomistic" individuals may communicate, relate, shape and
share their destiny cooperatively. 24 Indeed, individuals associated in
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Black, moreover, demolished the
argument. See id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting). In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 579 n.15 (1980), however, Chief Justice Burger used the ninth amendment in what
may become another famous footnote. This time the unenumerated rights clause was cited as a
means to justify protection for public trials not otherwise required to be kept public under the
sixth amendment. See infra note 129. See generally B. PATrERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH
AMENDMENT (1955); Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guaran-
tee, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 231 (1975).
22. Bodenheimer characterizes such radical legal positivism as "interpretive nihilism" that
"makes a theory of the nonformal sources of the law not only desirable but imperative." E.
BODENHEIMER, supra note 1, at 295.
Miller explains that the operation of the myth of objective principles often masks subjective
judicial preferences. He argues that the Supreme Court as a "Council of Elders" ought to use
these preferences consciously in making value choices for future generations through its deci-
sions, which are political accommodations. See A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL Acriv-
ISM: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 19-21 (1982).
23. This friction arises from an interpretation of individual rights through the concept of
judicial supremacy, a concept that developed uniquely within the United States.
24. SeeR. NozicK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 498-504 (1981) (moral basis of autonomy);
L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at ch. 15. It must be kept in mind that judicially protected autonomy
may lead to "pure" democracy through use of two-way cable or satellite broadcasting. Instant
majoritarian reactions to public issues of every kind can now be measured worldwide, as an
electronic device on television sets now permits individuals to respond to issues. No debate in a
public forum among the responding individual "atoms" is needed. Each one listens privately and
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cooperative enterprises or in governments often protect and promote
individual welfare more effectively at the collective level than private
individuals do by themselves. 25 Clashes occur when individuals or
private associations and groups of nation-states seek to promote collec-




D. Challenges to the Rule of Law
When contemporaries in the United States imagine the rule of law,
they cast a backward glance at the original nation-state concept,
27
which rests upon certain historical conditions that helped shape the
so-called "liberal" state. 28 We imagine that this earlier liberal (now
called conservative) state sought to liberate private individuals and
groups of "citizens" from their dependence on a centralized system of
powerful lords (elites) under a king (president). The liberal state
resulted from a balance of power, a compromise to prevent the basic
political ties between sovereign and subject from threatening the pow-
erful lords and their private armies while maintaining a central gov-
ernment to keep the peace. 29 Whether in a French or an English
responds privately. The first amendment protects information flowing in both directions. Should
this use of two-way broadcasting become implanted, it will alter significantly the role of elected
representatives in ways even the Founders with their own skepticism toward pure democracy did
not foresee. Control over subliminal influences on public opinion, by public or private corporate
expression that presently enjoys constitutional protection, could threaten profoundly a despised
and insular minority. Let us not forget, in passing, that the United States, in a global context, is
itself a prime minority target.
25. This idea is evident where the cumulative effects of private behavior add up to social
harm and therefore must be regulated by the collectivity, even though any single private act
might be quite harmless. For example, the emission of noxious gases from a single car exhaust or
a single factory would not justify wholesale regulation. The cumulative effect of many such
emissions might. The late Wolfgang Friedmann developed a coherent philosophy of interna-
tional cooperation from this venerable theme. See W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 492 (5th ed.
1967); W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (1959).
26. We are witnessing a struggle for a better global system based on principles of reason and
common interest where the cumulative effects of all kinds of human activity know no territorial
limitations. See the material on the international law of cooperation in INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 5, at ch. 15.
27. The system of nation-states is a relatively recent phenomenon that emerged as a work-
able system following the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648 marks the symbolic birth of the nation-state system. While some scholars
have written that the current nation-state and the international system composed of such states
are conceptually obsolete, a more accurate statement is that reality no longer corresponds to the
image raised by the word "state." See J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH (1982).
28. By "liberal state" I do not mean the current centralized welfare state, but the original
conception of a state whose central power was limited in relation to liberty.
29. Magna Carta was an early result of efforts by the lords to limit the king's power. The
exercise of central power was made "constitutional" when liberty, property or the king's peace
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system, central power was limited essentially by negative restraints,
i.e., by what those in power could not do by law to private individ-
uals.
These conditions have changed. The change occurred as a result of
the necessity for cooperation, since no juridically protected autono-
mous person or group is self-sufficient when at liberty. We find a most
curious paradox resulting-the problem of cooperation: To be juridi-
cally autonomous, an individual requires entitlements of human need
that are ultimately guaranteed by the state. These requirements can
be produced only by cooperative activity, be they for security, eco-
nomic well-being or education. No longer is it enough to define a
human right through our backward glance, thinking the rule of law to
be only a negative restraint on the central power's intrusion into
liberty.
The struggle for a definition of fundamental rights or affirmative,
substantive values in United States constitutional theory can be seen
through different prisms. Whether the juridical shape these prisms
take is called substantive due process, first amendment values, ninth
amendment unenumerated rights, equal protection or the various
forms of judicial scrutiny of legislation, the struggles to reconcile
fundamental rights with democratic theory occur within the context
of movement from the earlier liberal state to the later liberal state,
which we might rename the corporate welfare state.30 In this kind of
state, acts of representative majorities are not necessarily the embodi-
ment of human dignity for collectives of millions of autonomous
persons each wanting both freedom and security. The central consti-
tutional theory of the earlier liberal state no longer has much legiti-
macy. Even deregulation or the attempt to reverse the New Deal
requires federal activism by all three branches of the government.
Federal allocation of power to private power centers or to the states
requires as much unwritten constitutional mythology as earlier judi-
cial activism. Furthermore, democratic socialism 3I and Marxism, 3 2
was threatened, but always within the limits of the rule of law. By law, the king was entitled to
intervene only when one group so jeopardized the liberty of another group that his peace as
feudal sovereign was threatened. The lords, as a power elite, thus were kept at bay by the same
rule of law that shaped the king's legitimate power. Even the writs that issued to freemen from
the king's chancellor in England were limits to the power of the king's courts to intervene in the
affairs of baronial or manor courts.
30. See generally J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
31. In theory, socializing the means of production under a democratic polity may permit the
state as a business organization to promote positive human well-being. But socialism tends at the
same time to require individual fealty to the state in return for redistributional entitlements in a
manner incompatible with liberty. Moreover, the need to use science and technology to create
new wealth through present capital investment looking to future returns receives scant attention
from those with present need. The collective will is weak with respect to wealth-creating
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alternate theories of cooperation, have found no better way to recon-
cile the conflicting interests of individuals and the state than have the
western capitalist democracies.
Within this historical transition, the international human rights
movement presents intellectual questions of enormous significance. 31
It represents both a direct challenge to our constitutional provinciality
and, at the same time, a difficult paradox challenging the rule of
law. 34 Over the last few decades the American outlook has been
challenged by experiences typical of our epoch and recently thrust into
prominence on the home front, e.g., the problems presented by refu-
gees such as the Cubans, the Haitian boat people seeking political and
economic asylum on our shores, illegal aliens with their children, the
rise of a permanent underclass of unemployed citizens and inhuman
conditions in prisons and mental institutions. Circumstances are thus
bringing home to our courts in graphic fashion the impossibility of
remaining indifferent to universal policy formulations. At present, the
prospect of the United States under its written Constitution, being at
once judicially isolated from the rest of the world and at the same time
integrally enmeshed in this universal human condition, is even more
frightening than the dangers that lent urgency to the human rights
movement. An additional paradox is that the United Nations (UN),
seeking to implement specific human rights for all people in its charter
and in conventions and resolutions,35 has itself become a forum to
express collective condemnation of individual states or groups of states
ventures destined to bear fruit in a remote future. Pressing human needs demand present sharing
under most democratic socialist regimes. Sacrifice for the next generation, sometimes justified by
the need to "build socialism," is in reality suspect. Paradoxically, if new wealth is to be created
through investment, rights in privately owned capital may need protection against the majority.
32. Marxism is also flawed. As Freud explained and John Rawls noted, in a Marxist context
the special emotion of envy fuels the sense of injustice and promotes class struggle triggered by
the demand for equality. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 534-41 (1971). Ensuing claims for
distributive justice permit the mythical class struggle to be exploited politically. Despite Marx's
perceptive analysis of the contradictions of capitalism, Marxist regimes are born with destructive
tendencies and yield another noneconomic kind of tyranny, a dictatorship ultimately inimical to
human rights. Few limits on state power exist. Entitlements from the state, moreover, ensure
decreasing productivity and wealth unless the central regime invests at the expense of the
majority. See R. HEILBRONER, MARXISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1980), for a short, trenchant ap-
praisal.
33. See generally R. LILLICt & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1979); L.
SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1973).
34. This movement did not arise under a nationalistic system of legal right. Neither did it
result entirely from the natural law tradition. It sprang, rather, from an emerging consensus
about universal human dignity in a world threatened with nuclear holocaust and nationalistic
wars of survival, and boasting, ironically, only an impotent United Nations security system.
35. See Christenson, supra note 7, at 43 n.25.
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episodically hated by a majority of the organization. An additional
task for the international human rights movement, therefore, is to
seek means of enforcing limits not only on governments but also on the
UN.
III. INCORPORATING HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
An adequate theory of incorporation of human rights norms into
the process of constitutional interpretation requires prior acceptance
of the contradiction between the negative limits and the affirmative
goals that underpin human rights law. The allocation and exercise of
power under some orderly expectations of restraint do not necessarily
require a purely democratic global theory, which in effect would
subject the institutions of the United States to the same kinds of
majoritarian pressures that our own minorities face daily. But the
growing, living American Constitution can be used as an intellectual
and moral force in the world, and at the same time permit new
normative experience to enter from the world through interpretation
of its constitutional ambiguities and interstices.
36
By what theory is it possible to use those open-ended provisions of
the Bill of Rights as windows through which we may peer at the rich
sources of fundamental rights or values beyond our own polity? The
international human rights movement seeks a sharing of values and
aspirations at a level that all states may accept. While domestic and
international contexts differ, these values remain the same. If the
Austinian state, where law is the sovereign command that restrains
breaches of peace, is obsolete; if the nation-state system is in transition
with various states of culture and structure; and if the contradictions
of capitalism have also turned into contradictions within Marxist
thought itself, then the great irony is that, ultimately, international
human rights logically are claims from the larger community, inter-
posed in any polity with whatever political ideology for both limiting
power and allocating resources.31
The narrowest theoretical question for us, then, is by what constitu-
tional means a court may interpose wider community norms between
a nation-state and a citizen of that state to limit the acts of a represent-
ative majority.38 My interpretation suggests that consensus about in-
36. See id. at 55-57.
37. See D'Amato, supra note 12, at 1112-27 (seven propositions about the place of human
rights in international law).
38. The question is thus narrowed because international law is a horizontal legal order
limited by reciprocal enforcement applied to individuals directly by states or supranational
institutions. See id. at 1118, 1123; 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 880, 890-91 (1980).
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ternational human rights is replacing the original social contract the-
ory underpinning the European liberal state that formed the basis for
our present constitutional system of rights. If this interpretation is
sound, then our federal courts ought to pay heed, seeking to under-
stand what they do in two situations. First, in one guise or another, by
non-democratic judicial activism, they seek to evolve and implement
affirmative values in a manner quite inconsistent with classic liberal-
ism, where the rule of law places negative limits only for violation of a
process due or for violations of specific Bill of Rights limitations.
39
Without a proper understanding of the broader context, how can the
full sweep of judicial activism be justified by principled reasoning?
Second, by using common-law methodologies and open-ended texts,
our federal courts, in effect, have made possible a source for recogniz-
ing unenumerated rights shaped in a global context. 40 Without such a
context to guide interpretation, how can the courts answer the charge
of judicial abuse? Let us then turn to the particular issues of due
process and equal protection, beginning with some concrete cases in
the federal courts.
IV. INFORMING DUE PROCESS
Recent federal court decisions show better than theoretical para-
doxes how the human rights context can help shape practical deci-
sions. We have seen throughout history how a strict body of law can
be humanized in its concrete application through the influence of
ethical doctrines such as Greek stoic thought or moral principles
operating in the guise of equity. In Roman law, for example, the jus
gentium based on principles of right reason came to replace the
stricter jus civile in cases involving non-Roman citizens tried under the
edicts of the praetor peregrinus.41 Equity jurisprudence similarly re-
lieved the strictures of the common law in England case by case.42 The
vast heritage of moral philosophy informed decisions in each of these
epochal examples of intrusions by external factors into the realm of
positive law.
A similar process is presently showing signs of emerging in the
United States. Given the spirit of judicial isolation in domestic courts,
however, technical arguments are needed to sustain it. Two recent
39. See J. ELY, supra note 2.
40. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 601-10 (10th ed. 1980);
Grey, supra note 19.
41. See generally R. SOuM, THE INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW 41 (Ledlie trans. 1892).
42. See W. FIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 490-92 (5th ed. 1967).
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cases have been selected for study in this connection. One involves
protection of excludable aliens from arbitrary detention, 43 and the
other involves children of illegal aliens deprived of access to public
education and who successfully brought suit under the equal protec-
tion clause. 44 Both cases open the door for potential use of human
rights norms both to trigger heightened scrutiny of state action and to
use in other cases involving national power.
In Fernandez v. Wilkinson, the district court used international law
as a factor to determine the protection to be accorded excludable
aliens who had not gained entry to the United States. In that case, a
federal district court in Kansas was confronted with a writ of habeas
corpus of a Cuban refugee alleging "confinement" in a federal maxi-
mum security prison in violation of the eighth amendment and the
due process clause of the fifth amendment. 45 The refugee, who arrived
with the "freedom flotilla" in June 1980, was excludable, but his
deportation proved impossible because Cuba refused to readmit any
of the refugees. 46 Temporary detention of excludable aliens not imme-
diately deportable is sanctioned by statute47 and court decision, 48 but
other than temporary parole, return to the transporting vessel or
transportation to another country, no process for obtaining temporary
release is available. 49 In fact, under a revered fiction created by the
Supreme Court, excludable aliens are considered not legally present in
United States territory and therefore are outside the class of "persons"
protected by the due process clause. 50 An excludable alien seeking a
43. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aJ'd on other grounds sub
nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
44. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), afj'd, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
45. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 789 (D, Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds
sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
46. 505 F. Supp. at 789, 792.
47. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a),(d)(5), 1225(b), 1227 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
48. 505 F. Supp. at 790-91.
49. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1389, 1390.
50. The fiction excluding these particular aliens from constitutional protection is an old one,
resting on the status of the aliens. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 600 (1953). It
is based on the premise that excludable aliens have not been admitted into the United States and
therefore are not technically within its jurisdiction even if they are physically present. This
fiction, which is the functional equivalent of treating excludable aliens as non-persons, may be
overcome by using human rights norms to interpret the word "person" in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. See Christenson, supra note 7, at 50.
The precise argument for using human rights norms to so interpret the fifth and fourteenth
amendments must be narrow and should not suggest that all preventive detentions be barred.
Even under human rights norms, some detention of excludable aliens is permissible. Detention
should be prohibited only when it is not related to a compelling interest in protecting the public.
The detention must not be arbitrary or unreasonably long in relation to the time needed to
determine what should be done with the alien. Human rights norms provide a way in which the
competing interests may be balanced; however, their use must not be overstated.
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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
writ of habeas corpus, therefore, cannot look to the Constitution for
protection from indeterminate detention. 5 1 Confronted with this la-
cuna, the district court used international human rights norms to
shape a remedy granting relief from arbitrary detention.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, based on its
construction of the applicable statutes, and held that "detention is
permissible during proceedings to determine [aliens'] eligibility to
enter and, thereafter, during a reasonable period of negotiating for
their return to their country of origin or to the transporter that
brought them here. After such time, . . . the alien would be entitled
to release. '5 2 The Tenth Circuit deemed it proper to consider princi-
ples of international law in determining the fairness and propriety of
detaining aliens pending exclusion5 3 and stated that its holding was
consistent with accepted principles of international law that individ-
uals be free from arbitrary detention.
5 4
The Fernandez and Rodriguez-Fernandez decisions are significant
for several reasons. First, human rights law is used artfully to grant
relief to a narrow group of persons who would otherwise not be
entitled to protection because of a fiction that is the functional equiva-
lent of treating them as non-persons. 55 The district court in Fernandez
was "unwilling to initiate the corrosion of this venerable legal doctrine
[that excludable aliens are not legally present] by holding that the
force of the fiction diminishes" as the time that an excluded alien is
detained increases .5  The court thought such a holding unnecessary
because it found that its
review of the sources from which customary international law is derived
clearly demonstrates that arbitrary detention is prohibited by customary
international law. Therefore, even though the indeterminate detention
of an excluded alien cannot be said to violate the United States Constitu-
tion or our statutory laws, it is judicially remediable as a violation of
international law.
57
The district court in Fernandez traced the history of the fiction that excludable aliens are not
entitled to constitutional protection through federal case law. 505 F. Supp. at 790. The principle
has been upheld in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206 (1953); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537 (1950).
51. The court reasoned in Fernandez that "the machinery of domestic law utterly fails to
operate to assure protection." 505 F. Supp. at 795.
52. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1389-90 (10th Cir. 1981).
53. Id. at 1388.
54. Id. at 1390.
55. See supra note 50.
56. 505 F. Supp. at 790.
57. Id. at 798.
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CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
Universal recognition of the principle that all human beings should
be protected from arbitrary detention provides a narrow base from
which a gap in United States constitutional law may be filled without
a direct need to challenge the validity of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. 58 While the district court used autonomous human rights
norms to fill a narrow gap in constitutional protection, the Tenth
Circuit, in effect, used those same rules to expand the notion of due
process. Observing that due process is an evolutionary concept that
takes into account accepted notions of fairness, and recognizing the
fundamental principle that all human beings should be free from
arbitrary detention, the court determined that Fernandez had been
detained arbitrarily s.5  Rather than finding that the Constitution failed
to provide protection, the court of appeals arguably interpreted the
concept of due process, enlightened by principles of international law,
to cover excludable aliens in detention situations. The opinions of the
district court and the court of appeals thus show that autonomous
international human rights norms can be used either to fill gaps in
constitutional protection or to interpret constitutional commands, and
that in both cases the results are substantially the same.60
The second reason that the Fernandez and Rodriguez-Fernandez
decisions are significant concerns the use of human rights norms in
fixing a standard by which to define arbitrary detention with respect
to a group of persons unprotected by the fifth amendment. The
district court properly looked to positive sources of customary interna-
tional law as evidence that a fundamental human right to be free from
arbitrary detention exists." These sources of international law were
treaties and the custom and practice of civilized nations. 62 The district
58. An interesting aspect of this narrow use of international law in constitutional interpreta-
tion is that it would have been quite unnecessary to find and apply the positive human rights law
had the Supreme Court given proper meaning to "persons" under the fifth amendment. The fifth
amendment states that "no person" may be denied due process; it does not say "no citizen or
legally admitted alien." See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Christenson, supra note 7, at 50.
59. 654 F.2d at 1388.
60. See Martineau, Interpreting the Constitution: The Use of International Human Rights
Norms, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 87 (1983); 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-100 (1981) (symposium on human
rights).
61. 505 F. Supp. at 795-800. The district court, citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980), stated that "[p]rinciples of customary international law may be discerned from
an overview of express international conventions, the teachings of legal scholars, the general
custom and practice of nations and relevant judicial decisions." 505 F. Supp. at 798.
62. The district court's review of the sources of customary international law included the
United Nations Charter, signed June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993; the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948),
and the views of legal scholars that the Universal Declaration, through its wide acceptance, has
made binding customary law; the American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22,
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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
court went no further than necessary to find and apply the particular
norm against arbitrary detention, and did not invoke "natural law" to
fill this narrow gap in constitutional protection.6 3 This laudable re-
straint is an important aspect of the proper use of international human
rights norms by United States courts. These norms supply a context,
guide interpretation and fill gaps in the positive law, but their use
requires convincing technical presentation of the positive sources of
customary international law before they are contextually persuasive.
This pattern of legal growth through ad hoc interpretation of dis-
crete rights is new neither to the common-law tradition nor to its civil
law counterpart. It is in fact remarkably similar to the preference
shown in Bill of Rights litigation, after rejection of Justice Black's
theory of wholesale incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the four-
teenth amendment, for separate consideration of each fundamental
right.6 4 One at a time, fundamental rights based on the first eight
amendments have grown through constitutional adjudication and
have been made directly applicable to state action by careful, work-
manlike judicial use of open-ended constitutional provisions limiting
the majoritarian power of government.6 5 My thesis is that the human
rights context similarly offers an alternative source of tools for arriving
at principled decisions while avoiding the dangers of subjective activ-
ism. Interpreting individual cases arising under the due process clause
within this context can transform theoretical contradictions outlined
above through practical decisions that avoid placing the United States
in direct conflict with international law.
1969, OAS T.S. No. 36, OAS O.R. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), O.R. OEA/Ser.A/
16; the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (1968); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966. (The court cited these last three documents as "indicative of
the customs and usages of civilized nations." 505 F. Supp. at 797.) The court also quoted
Congressman Donald M. Frasier and Patricia M. Derian, former Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, as members of the Congress and Executive Depart-
ment who have recognized an international legal right to freedom from arbitrary detention. Id.
at 797-98. Furthermore, the district court, citing France ex rel. Madame Julien Chevreau, M.S.
Dept. of State, file no. 500.AIA/1197 (cited in M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1937)), stated that "[t]ribunals enforcing international law have also recognized arbitrary
detention as giving rise to a legal claim." 505 F. Supp. at 798-99.
63. A giant leap would be required if one were to argue incorporation of the entire corpus of
human rights law into United States constitutional law, as some human rights advocates have
insisted. The court did not make such a leap, nor should we. See Christenson, supra note 7, at 51.
64. See id. at 52 n.71.
65. See generally Brest, supra note 1; Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth
Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
1983]
HeinOnline  -- 52 U. Cin. L. Rev. 17 1983
    17 
   r   i lar 
r  i t it r  t ti ,   l   
fill t i  rr   i  tit ti al i . 63 le 
 t t   l  
ri t  r   it  t t  t .  l t, 
Ui  t tion  ,  
 i  l ti    
 ti al   l   
 l t   t tion 
t    r    
l  t rt.   l   
i ,   '  
 le ti     
 t, te i    
i t. 64    , l   t 
ts   i l ti   
   ir tl  li l  t  t t    l, 
 l  ti al  i  
t  j it rian   . 6    
ri ts t t si il rl  ff r   lt r ti e   t l    
 i led     ti  
i . t ting i i i l       
it i  t is t t  tr f r  t r ti l t i ti s tli  
 t  l      
i  i t li t    
1969, OAS T.S. o. 36, S . . EA/Ser. I III.23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), . . / er. I 
; t e e ti  f r t  r t ti  f  i t   t l ,  
ov. 4,1950,213 . . .S. 222 (1968); the International ovenant  i il a  liti l i ts, 
opened for signature ec. 19, 1966. ( he c rt cite  t ese last t ree ts s i i tive f 
the custo s and usages of ci ilize  ati s."  . . t .)  rt l  t  
ongress an onald . Frasier and atricia . erian, f r er ssist t r t r  f t t  f r 
u an Rights and u anitarian ffairs, as e bers of the ongress a  ec ti e e art-
ent ho have rec ize  a  i ter ati nal l l ri t t  fr  fr  r itr r  t ti . . 
at 797-98. Further ore, the district court, citi  ra ce ex rei. a a e J li  r , . . 
ept. of State, file no. 500. IA/U97 (cited i  . I N,  I  I I L  
( )), t t  t t t i ls i g l   
detention as i i  ris  t   l l l i ."  . . t . 
63.  giant leap ould be required if e ere t  ar e i r r ti  f t  tir  r  f 
hu an rights la  into nited "States constitutional la , as so e a  ri ts t s  
insisted. The court did not ake such a leap, nor should e. See hristenson, supra note , at . 
.  i . t  
.  ll  t,  t  ; i , ration" t enth 
e e t,   . .  ( ). 
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V. INFORMING EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The recent case of Plyler v. Doe involved a Texas statute that
denied reimbursement to local school districts of funds spent for the
education of children who were not residing in that district or who
were not legally in the United States.66 The Supreme Court did not
apply the test of strict scrutiny, finding that illegal aliens were not a
"suspect class" because their illegal presence in this country was con-
stitutionally relevant 7 and that the Constitution guaranteed no fun-
damental right to education.68 Justice Brennan, writing for a majority
of five, applied an intermediate standard of scrutiny by reason of the
"lifetime hardship" the statute in question represented for this "dis-
crete class of children not accountable for their disabling status." 69
The majority enunciated the standard of scrutiny it applied by predi-
cating the necessary rationality of the legislation upon the "[further-
ance of] some substantial goal of the State. '70 Citing De Canas v.
Bica7 1 for the proposition that states "do have some authority to act
with respect to illegal aliens . . . ,",72 the Court nevertheless found no
congressional policy providing any support for the state statute.
7 3
In Plyler, as in Fernandez, some individuals were denied constitu-
tional protection by reason of a status derived from a statutory classifi-
cation. Human rights activists have argued that positive human rights
law recognizes a right of access to free public education for all chil-
dren.74 These arguments go beyond what is needed to inform the
guarantee of equal protection. No Supreme Court decision has ever
recognized a constitutional right to education, as the Court in Plyler
affirmed. However, once a state decides to provide free public educa-
tion, it may not lightly deny some children that privilege, although
disparities due to wealth validly may exist. 75 If children are denied
66. 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).




71. 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (states have some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at
least where state legislation embodies federal objectives and advances proper state goals).
72. 102 S. Ct. at 2399.
73. Id. at 2400.
74. The following international instruments recognize a right to education: Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, art. 26(1), G.A. Res. 217A (1II), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 13(1), entered into force Jan. 3, 1976,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in Education, arts.
3(e), 4; Declaration of the Rights of the Child, principle 7.
75. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (any wealth
discrimination against residents of less wealthy districts, created by ad valorem tax levied by
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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
education solely by reason of their status as illegal aliens, however, a
stronger argument would be that specific human rights provisions,
binding upon many nation-states through external sources of custom
or agreement, justify application of a stricter standard of scrutiny to
discriminatory classifications burdening these rights. This argument is
more persuasive than the argument that an autonomous human rights
norm such as free public education, never recognized as such in
United States constitutional law, limits state action. In a proper case,
of course, the existence of such a norm might be so universal as to
constitute a limitation on state action even if the strict scrutiny stand-
ard of equal protection fails (as in genocide). But to have to sustain the
existence of such a limitation by using customary international law
would impose a heavy burden indeed on the proponent.
Discriminatory classifications based on race, sex and legal alienage
trigger strict, or at least heightened, scrutiny. 76 The class of excludable
aliens such as in Fernandez also may require heightened scrutiny of
any state action not preempted by the federal power over foreign
affairs.77 One question in Plyler, thus, was whether a classification
entailing discriminatory treatment of children of illegal aliens had to
survive a stricter standard of scrutiny than the normally minimal
standard requiring merely that state action be rational.
78
One method of approaching this question, in addition to traditional
tests, is to examine the broader context of the right being abridged by
the discriminatory classification. Human rights norms can provide
that context. They indicate the consensus of civilized nations that
education and equal treatment for aliens or minorities without politi-
cal power are important values.79 This Article argues that discrimina-
tory classification that burdens a fundamental right reinforced by
these international norms should trigger, under principles of equal
protection, at least heightened scrutiny. This interpretation offers a
principled way to recognize the growth of important unenumerated
each school district to supplement state contributions for education, did not create a suspect
class).
76. For commentary on the equal protection "tests," their content and application, see G.
GUNTHER, supra note 40; W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS ch. 14 (4th ed. 1975); L. TRIBE, supra note 2.
77. For a discussion of the present tendency to use federal preemption instead of equal
protection analysis, see Note, State Burdens on Resident Aliens: A New Preemption Analysis, 89
YALE L.J. 940 (1980) (preemption test with analogy inquiry more satisfactory than equal
protection analysis to distinguish between permissible and impermissible state burdens on resi-
dent and illegal aliens).
78. Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. at 2394-95.
79. See M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CIIEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
773 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HUMAN RIGHTS].
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CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
rights related to those protected in our Bill of Rights while maintain-
ing representative democracy in balance with judicial activism. Equal
protection claims for stricter scrutiny might be reinforced with evi-
dence of customary international law in which a given right is deeply
rooted in a universal consensus using external sources of law. Consti-
tutional theory thus can be used to invalidate discriminatory classifi-
cations that intrude upon fundamental human rights of illegal aliens
without meeting the test of compelling or significant state interest by
narrowly tailored means. 80 Perhaps even citizens might use such an
argument when rights accorded them by nation-states are established
by traditional sources of international law.
This argument is tighter and less vulnerable than one that claims
that a discriminatory law must fall because it violates either a treaty
standard, when the treaty is not clearly self-executing, or a standard
incorporated from customary international law. By using arguments
of incorporation, in fact, human rights zealots can do much harm. If a
vulnerable ground is presented to the Supreme Court, an advocate
invites the Court to reject it, especially when it is neither essential to
the case nor necessary for decision. Using human rights norms to
buttress a claim for a standard of constitutional scrutiny more strict
than it otherwise might be does not risk rejection of the claim. The
interpretive aid, moreover, offers sources that reconcile customary
international law with the Constitution. Claims for wholesale incor-
poration of customary international law, such as the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights,8' into federal common law are simply too
weak.82 Also, they can be superseded by statute. A comprehensive
study, cataloguing basic human rights in the equal protection context
through use of the conventions and customs available, might serve as
an analytic tool to arrive at a more adequate standard of scrutiny in
cases involving fundamental human rights.
Plyler leads us directly to consider equal protection in other
alienage cases. Supreme Court decisions in the last few terms have
opened another area of confusion: the troublesome question of defin-
ing substantive grounds for determining the level of scrutiny to be
used. In deciding how external sources might aid in defining these
grounds, we need to trace the decisions.
80. See generally Paust, Litigating Human Rights: A Commentary on the Comment, 4
Hous. J. INT'L L. 81 (1981); Paust, Human Rights: From Jurisprudential Inquiry to Effective
Litigation (Book Review), 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (1981).
81. G.A. Res. 217A (Ii), 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948).
82. See Christenson, supra note 7, at 40.
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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
VI. ALIENAGE: THE EVOLUTION OF TESTS APPLIED IN EQUAL
PROTECTION CASES
Supreme Court tests for scrutinizing statutory classification schemes
in suits by aliens invoking the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment (or the equal protection component of the fifth amend-
ment) have evolved from an original preference for the rational basis
test. Next, the Court introduced strict scrutiny of a suspect classifica-
tion, with a recent return to a rational basis analysis for legislation
supported by overriding national interests.8 3 The latter political or
governmental exception to the new general rule of strict scrutiny in
alienage cases presents curious anomalies questioning the validity of
incorporating the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment (limiting state action) into the fifth amendment (limiting na-
tional power). The equal protection analysis under both amendments
should be informed by external sources of developing human rights
norms. My technical argument is that this interpretation offers a
principled explanation of the anomaly with guidelines that provide a
sound policy for protecting "discrete and insular minorities" 84 in rela-
tion to national power.
8 5
Recent alienage cases requiring equal protection analysis have used
the rational basis test when examining classifications of applicants for
"public function" employment. Under the test derived from Sugar-
man v. Dougall,
each state has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and
the manner in which they shall be chosen .... [T]his power and re-
sponsibility of the State applies, not only to the qualifications of voters,
but also to persons holding state elective or important nonelective execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who participate di-
rectly in the formation, execution, or review of broad public policy
perform functions that go to the heart of representative government.
86
This test has meant rational basis scrutiny for (and the upholding of)
requirements of American nationality to be a state trooper 7 and
intent at least to seek naturalization for potential public school teach-
83. See generally Hull, Resident Aliens and the Equal Protection Clause: The Burger Court's
Retreatfrom Graham v. Richardson, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 39-41 (1980) (concluding that the
Court appears to have retreated from, if not in fact repudiated, its holding in Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)).
84. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
85. For the Court's own historical overview of this process, see Examining Bd. of Eng'rs,
Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 604-05 (1976).
86. 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
87. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296-301 (1978).
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CINCINNATI LA W RE VIE W
ers.88 In a very recent case, Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, the Court once
again applied the "public function" exception to the strict scrutiny
"rule" for aliens.89 The case involved resident alien applicants for the
position of deputy probation officer, classified by statute in California
under the general heading "peace officer."90 Although the classifica-
tion of positions as "peace officers" was described as lacking any
rational basis by the dissent,"' the Court in a five to four decision
sustained as reasonable the state requirement that deputy probation
officers, as peace officers whose functions went " 'to the heart of
representative government,' " had to be American citizens. 92 In Ply-
ler, by contrast, although the Court in effect applied an intermediate
standard of scrutiny to invalidate the tuition charge for children of
illegal aliens, it refused to hold that they constituted a "suspect
class. "
9 3
Certain cases have applied due process analysis rather than equal
protection principles to alienage classifications. In Terrace v. Thomp-
son, a 1923 case that upheld a state statute prohibiting ownership of
land by aliens who had not declared their intention to become citizens
of the United States, the Court reasoned that the statute was not so
capricious as to amount to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty or
property. 4 In Examining Board of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors
v. Flores de Otero, 5 the Court held unconstitutional a Puerto Rican
statute barring aliens from private practice as engineers, under both
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth and the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, using the Bolling v. Sharpe6 technique
of condemning egregious, offensive discrimination as violative of due
process.97 In Mathews v. Diaz, the Court used the rationality test in a
unanimous decision upholding under the due process clause a section
of the Social Security Act that denied medicare benefits to aliens sixty-
88. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
89. 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
90. Id. at 433-34.
91. Id. at 451-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 440, 445-47 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
93. 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2398 (1982) (noting that in view of costs both to country and to alien
children, "discrimination [worked by the Texas statute] can hardly be considered rational unless
it furthers some substantial goal of the State").
94. 263 U.S. 197, 216-18 (1923). The Court also determined that the statute was not
repugnant to the equal protection clause. Id. at 218-22. Thus the due process analysis the Court
applied was not the exclusive test used to determine the constitutionality of the statute in
question.
95. 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
96. 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
97. 426 U.S. at 599-606.
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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
five years or older who had neither been admitted for permanent
residence nor resided in the United States for over five years. 8
The "traditional" strict scrutiny of alienage classifications seems to
apply at present only to questions of private, economic benefits.9
Whenever the strict scrutiny test is applied to nonpolitical cases, in
most instances it results in prompt invalidation of the challenged
legislation. 00 That the Court recognizes its lack of consistency in this
area is evident from Justice Powell's declaration in In re Griffiths: "To
be sure, the course of decisions protecting the employment rights of
resident aliens has not been an unswerving one."''° The Court, not
surprisingly, attaches no "particular significance" to the variety of
adjectives that describe the kind of state interest required to overcome
the strict scrutiny standard: "overriding," "compelling," "important,"
or "substantial. "102
In addressing the constitutionality of state statutes involving aliens,
the Court has used, in addition to the equal protection and due
process clauses, analyses based on the supremacy clause, the exclusive
federal power over immigration and naturalization, preemption and
even "political question" considerations. The recent case of Toll v.
Moreno confirms the present tendency of the Court to base its deci-
sions in federal cases on the supremacy clause or Congress's immigra-
tion and naturalization power rather than the more traditional equal
protection or due process analysis as applied to state action. 0 3 The
Moreno Court expressly declined to consider plaintiffs' due process
and equal protection challenges to the University of Maryland's policy
of refusing "in-state" status for tuition purposes to children of G-4 visa
98. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). The Court also relied on the great deference owed to Congress in the
"political question" of 440,000 Cuban refugees and potential claimants then in the country, thus
begging the question in part, because all legal questions at the same time contain political
assumptions. See id. at 81-82 & nn.20-21.
99. See Toll v. Moreno, 102 S. Ct. 2977, 2988 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussion
of present state of affairs in the equal protection/alienage area, emphasizing that the Court has
"experienced no noticeable discomfort in applying strict scrutiny to alienage classifications that
did not involve political interests").
100. See, e.g., Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.
572 (1976) (citizenship requirement for civil engineering practice under Puerto Rican statute
struck down); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (citizenship requirement for admission to the
Connecticut bar violates equal protection clause under strict scrutiny analysis); Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (New York statute barring aliens from competitive civil service
struck down under strict scrutiny test); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state
statutes relating citizenship requirements to welfare benefits failed strict scrutiny test and
impermissibly encroached upon exclusive federal power over immigration and naturalization).
101. 413 U.S. 717, 720 (1973).
102. Id. at 722 n.9.
103. See 102 S. Ct. 2977 (1982).
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CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
holders (employees of international organizations, banks, etc. who are
allowed to establish a domicile in the United States). That policy, the
Court held instead, violated the supremacy clause. 104 As sources of the
federal power over immigration, Justice Brennan cited the "Uniform
Rule of Naturalization," the "foreign" commerce clause and the for-
eign affairs powers, and in a footnote cited an article by Perry to the
effect that "commentators have noted . . . that many of the Court's
decisions concerning alienage classifications . . . are better explained
in preemption than equal protection terms. "105 This analysis, how-
ever, begs the question of why, if the same limitations of equal protec-
tion apply to the national government as to state action, a federal
statute could do what a state statute could not.
In his dissent in Moreno, Justice Rehnquist maintained that the
Immigration and Nationality Act in no way precludes states from
passing laws that burden aliens, and those laws will be invalidated
only if they frustrate Congress's "unambiguously declared . . . inten-
tion" to preempt the field. 0 Moreover, he asserted that "[i]n light of
several recent decisions, . . . it is clear that not every alienage classifi-
cation is subject to strict scrutiny" and discussed the most commonly
advanced justification for strict scrutiny of alienage classifications:
lack of access to the political process and the ensuing powerlessness. 
107
He argued that in light of the recently enhanced political function
exception to the strict scrutiny requirement in alienage cases, "the
political powerlessness of aliens is itself the consequence of distinctions
on the basis of alienage that are constitutionally permissible.' ' 0 Thus
he concluded that legislation affecting aliens should be subject only to
rational basis scrutiny. 10 9 Justice Blackmun, in a concurrence highly
critical of Rehnquist's position, forcefully insisted that alienage con-
tinues to be a suspect criterion and that aliens remain members of a
discrete and insular minority, often "victims of irrational discrimina-
tion."1 0
Moreno illustrates the trends presently vying for predominance in
the field of alienage: equal protection tests (strict scrutiny, heightened
scrutiny or rational basis) and non-equal protection devices (the su-
premacy clause, preemption or federal powers over immigration or
104. Id. at 2986.
105. Id. at 2983 n.16 (citing Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and
Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979)).
106. Id. at 2991 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 2997-99.
108. Id. at 2998.
109. Id. at 2997.
110. Id. at 2987-88.
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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
foreign affairs). The area, in sum, is in a state of flux."' An adequate
conceptual framework, using external sources of human rights law,
might offer a principled way out of the paradox of judicial provincial-
ism at each of the points of equal protection or due process analysis.
VII. THE EQUAL PROTECTION COMPONENT OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT
As a transition between the discussion of equal protection regarding
aliens and the incorporation of the equal protection component into
the fifth amendment, no case is more appropriate than Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, a five to four decision the Court handed down in
that "year of the alien" 1976 (with which 1982 seems in serious
competition)." 2 The most interesting aspect of Hampton is its express
declaration that the federal government, by virtue of its exclusive
power over aliens, validly can pass legislation that would be invalid
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."
3
Hampton contains a relatively long comparison of the equal protec-
tion elements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. In addition,
the court mentions "overriding national interests" as possible justifica-
tion for a rule "that would be unacceptable for an individual State. ""
14
This anomaly leads us to inquire whether the paradox of judicial
provincialism might be broken by reference to a broader body of
positive human rights norms, not as a limitation but as an external
source that could inform the meaning and shape the growth of consti-
tutional limitations. '1
Before discussing the vicissitudes and actual mechanics involved in
grafting fourteenth amendment equal protection onto the fifth
amendment stalk, it is useful to set forth the underlying philosophy of
the operation. One of the best formulations of the Court's conception
111. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
112. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). In the present term, the Court has decided Landon v. Plasencia, 103
S. Ct. 321 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (permanent resident alien returning from Mexico with illegal
aliens in car properly submitted to exclusion hearing rather than deportation hearing); Toll v.
Moreno, 102 S. Ct. 2977 (1982) (state denial of in-state status to alien G-4 visa holders for tuition
purposes preempted by supremacy clause); Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982) (state statute
denying free public education to children of illegal aliens struck down); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,
454 U.S. 432 (1982) (California's requirement of United States citizenship for "peace officer"
candidates constitutionally permissible).
113. See 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
114. Id.
115. See Christenson, supra note 7, at 54 (human rights norms should be used to interpret
existing constitutional standards rather than as independent authority to support claims of denial
of fundamental rights).
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CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
of that rationale is found in Hampton: "The federal sovereign, like the
States, must govern impartially. The concept of equal justice under
law is served by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process, as
well as by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.""" This ideal impartiality is as difficult to attain as it sounds,
and the Court is well aware that the line of its decisions involving
equal protection, whether under the fifth or the fourteenth amend-
ment, is far from "unswerving.""17 Justice Rehnquist's majority opin-
ion in the recent case of United States Railroad Retirement Board v.
Fritz"8 recognized the difficulty of deducing trustworthy guidelines
from those decisions:
The most arrogant legal scholar would not claim that all of these cases
applied a uniform or consistent test under equal protection principles.
And realistically speaking, we can be no more certain that this opinion
will remain undisturbed than were those who joined the opinion in
Lindsley,. . . Royster Guano Co. . . . or any of the other cases referred
to in this opinion and in the dissenting opinion."'
After providing this revealing glimpse at the judicial attitude toward
the solidity of precedent, the Justice explained how the Court avoids a
non liquet: "But like our predecessors and our successors, we are
obliged to apply the equal protection component of the Fifth Amend-
ment as we believe the Constitution requires .... 1,20
This realization that due process and equal protection cases are
increasingly difficult to synthesize was mentioned once again by Jus-
tice Powell in his concurrence in a 1982 case, Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co. ' 21 His concurrence is yet another recognition of the anoma-
lous results in the equal protection cartography:
It is necessary for this Court to decide cases during almost every Term
on due process and equal protection grounds. Our opinions in these
areas often are criticized, with justice, as lacking consistency and clar-
ity. Because these issues arise in varied settings, and opinions are written
by each of nine Justices, consistency of language is an ideal unlikely to
be achieved.12
2
116. 426 U.S. at 100.
117. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
118. 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (upholding with great deference Congress's classification by which
some railroad employees eligible for both social security and railroad retirement benefits retained
the "windfall" while others did not).
119. Id. at 176 n.10 (citations omitted).
120. Id.
121. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
122. Id. at 443 n.* (Powell, J., concurring).
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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
This awareness of possible inconsistencies in its equal protection deci-
sions leads the Court on occasion to be skeptical about the different
degrees of scrutiny and thus of the basis for deference to the legisla-
ture. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Rostker v. Gold-
berg, described the dangers presented in applying equal protection
scrutiny to the national government in the draft registration case:
"Announced degrees of 'deference' to legislative judgments, just as
levels of 'scrutiny' which this Court announces that it applies to
particular classifications made by a legislative body, may all too
readily become facile abstractions used to justify a result.-123 The
Court's deference in Rostker to the national power of Congress was
extraordinary.
Despite the dangers and anomalies, it is possible to trace the evolu-
tion of equal protection incorporation into the fifth amendment.
Commentators who have studied this evolution are not in agreement
about whether the two modes of equal protection are identical. Ken-
neth Karst has maintained that the content of both equal protection
norms is indeed the same. 12 4 More recently, Robert Bohrer, insisting
on Chief Justice Warren's language in Boiling v. Sharpe,12 5 asserted
that the two are not identical, and that the inquiry under the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment must remain "whether
a discrimination is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due proc-
ess.' " 126 Bohrer pointed out that between Boiling and Shapiro v.
Thompson,127 the Court ceased to make any distinction between the
two modes of equal protection. 2 Dean Ely's trenchant analysis of the
annals of incorporation rests on the plain meaning of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, noting that if equal protection is included in
the concept of due process, why was it necessary to make it an express
limitation on the states? 29 This gradual confusion lasted until Hamp-
123. 453 U.S. 57, 69-70 (1981).
124. See Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REV. 541
(1977).
125. 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("[tlhe 'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard
of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and, therefore, we do not imply that the two
are always interchangeable phrases").
126. See Bohrer, Bakke, Weber and Fullilove: Benign Discrimination and Congressional
Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 56 IND. L.J. 473, 476-78 (1981) (quoting Boiling,
347 U.S. at 499).
127. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
128. Bohrer, supra note 126, at 477.
129. J. ELY, supra note 2, at 24-28. See generally Henkin, supra note 65. The historical
background of the fourteenth amendment and an anti-incorporationist viewpoint are set forth in
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Under-
standing, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
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CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
ton, and no attempt to work through a principled explanation of the
incorporation was made. References to the problem of equal protec-
tion incorporation into the due process clause of the fifth amendment
simply assumed the conclusion. Practically all such references have
been made by way of a footnote. Little by little those footnotes
became quite as stylized as African art, with only a few variations on
the theme. 130
The leading case after Bolling was Schneider v. Rusk.' 3' The
Schneider Court used the Bolling conception of due process type equal
protection in a fifth amendment decision based in part on "impermis-
sible presumption" grounds, the presumption being that naturalized
citizens are apt to be less loyal to the United States than the native
born variety. 32 Five years later, in Shapiro v. Thompson, what be-
came the state of the art footnote appeared in the body of the opinion:
"[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it
does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of
due process.' ",'33 Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Shapiro expressed
his dissatisfaction with the majority's application of a strict scrutiny
standard to the right of travel, allegedly infringed by a District of
Columbia statute imposing a residence requirement for welfare appli-
cants to receive benefits.134 Justice Harlan, also in dissent, implied
that the Court might become a super legislature if it picked out rights
at random and labeled them "fundamental" without principled classi-
ficatory criteria. 135
A number of cases have held that the Court's analysis is the same in
all equal protection cases regardless of their ultimate basis in the fifth
or the fourteenth amendments. 36 More recent decisions have used the
130. For other uses of footnotes, see, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938) (the famous Carolene Products footnote). In a more recent example, Chief Justice
Burger used the ninth amendment with respect to unspecified aspects of the sixth amendment
right to public trial in what may become another famous footnote. Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579 n.15 (1980) (ninth amendment drafted to allay the fears of those
concerned that expressing certain guarantees could be read as excluding others).
131. 377 U.S. 163 (1964). A section of the Immigration and Nationality Act depriving
naturalized citizens of their American nationality if they resided more than three years in their
country of origin was struck down as discrimination "so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process." Id. at 168 (citing Bolling, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
132. Id.
133. 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (citing Boling, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
134. See id. at 652-53 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
136. Among the more forceful affirmations of that idea are those in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that
under the Fourteenth Amendment"); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 770 (1975) ("While the
present case, involving as it does a federal statute, does not directly implicate the Fourteenth
[Vol. 52
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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
same tests or levels of scrutiny under both modes of equal protec-
tion. 137 An interesting suggestion that equal protection guarantees
were part of the Constitution even before promulgation of the four-
teenth amendment and therefore obviously as much a part of the fifth
as the fourteenth is found (in a footnote!) in Vance v. Bradley:
Concern with assuring equal protection was part of the fabric of our
Constitution even before the Fourteenth Amendment expressed it most
directly in applying it to the States .... Accordingly, the Court has
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the
Federal Government from denying equal protection of the laws. 3
This literary conceit surely is a legal fiction, for how can the need for
the express equal protection clause be explained other than to admit a
stricter standard for states than for the federal government? The
reason is that the new normative experience buttressing the judicial
notion of similar limits on all power grew from the values underpin-
ning the concerns for human rights after World War II. Yet, the
justices are so skeptical of subjectivism that they blanch at any at-
tempt at defining unenumerated fundamental rights. 3 Partly, this
reluctance rests on the fallacy of the Court's own subjective preference
for tailoring external sources of law in constitutional interpretation.
This reluctance becomes a provincial paradox when the very reason
used for asserting an overriding national interest in controlling aliens
is a concept of international law called "sovereignty." If that concept
is used to assert power requiring less strict scrutiny than that provided
under equal protection analysis, then why not use international law
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, a classification that meets the test articulated in Dan-
dridge [fourteenth amendment case] is perforce consistent with the due process requirement of
the Fifth Amendment") (emphasis added); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2
(1975) ("This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been
precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment"); Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364 n.4 (1974) ("Thus, if a classification would be invalid under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also inconsistent with the due
process requirement of the Fifth Amendment") (citing Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
(1971)).
137. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1978) ("We conclude that the gender
classification of [the statute] is not substantially related to the attainment of any important and
valid statutory goals. It is, rather, part of the 'baggage of sexual stereotypes' ....Legislation
that rests on such presumptions, without more, cannot survive scrutiny under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment").
138. 440 U.S. 93, 94 n.1 (1979) (citing Hampton, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Buckley, 424 U.S. 1
(1976); Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Boiling, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); other citations omitted).
In Vance, the Court upheld a provision of the Foreign Service Act that provided for mandatory
retirement at age sixty under the rational basis standard.
139. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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CINCINNATI LA W RE VIE W
concepts to inform the meaning of limits on sovereignty suggested by
the emergence of new norms of human rights law, established under
traditional methods using well-defined sources of law? Under this
conception, the principled basis for heightened scrutiny in fifth
amendment cases would not be to incorporate these norms into the
Bill of Rights, as some have suggested, but to use them to determine
whether the burden on human dignity is so fundamentally proscribed
that scrutiny of the exercise of sovereign power increases.
The cases in which the identity of fifth and fourteenth amendment
equal protection is asserted are cases in which the "levels of scrutiny"
the Court applies to federal legislation are the same as those it applies
under the fourteenth. When the Court in Califano v. Boles refused to
"certify" a class as actually discriminated against by the allegedly
discriminatory legislation, and thus applied a rational basis standard
of review, it made no express references to incorporation of fourteenth
amendment equal protection into fifth amendment due process.
40
The Court simply stated that "to make out a disparate impact war-
ranting further scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, it is necessary to show that the class which is purport-
edly discriminated against consequently suffers significant deprivation
of a benefit or imposition of a substantial burden.'' 4 Human rights
norms would aid in determining whether a deprivation or burden
might result in a substantial departure from universal expectations of
human dignity and thereby inform the Court's use of strict scrutiny.
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong was a crossroads of issues, and marks
either a turning point or an accident in the evolutionary process under
consideration here. 42 That case involved the constitutionality of Civil
Service Commission regulations barring aliens from Civil Service em-
ployment. The decision referred to the difference between equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the equal protection
component of the fifth. "[B]oth Amendments require the same type of
analysis" according to the Court, but "the two protections are not
always coextensive."1 43 Pointing out that while both amendments con-
tain identical due process clauses, only the fourteenth boasts an equal
protection clause, the Court stated in a footnote its belief that "the
primary office of the [Equal Protection Clause] differs from, and is
140. See 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (statute denying social security insurance benefits to unwed
mothers upon death of the father held constitutional; classification was rationally related to a
legitimate legislative purpose).
141. Id. at 295.
142. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
143. Id. at 100.
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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
additive to, the protection guaranteed by the [Due Process
Clause]."'1 44 The Court went on to underscore that in certain circum-
stances, equal protection analysis is more stringent when applied to
the states: "there may be overriding national interests which justify
selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an individ-
ual State. ' 145 When there are no "overriding national interests," the
Hampton Court noted that "the Due Process Clause has been con-
strued as having the same significance as the Equal Protection
Clause.' ' 46 As an example of legislation not presenting an "overriding
national interest," the Court indicated "a federal rule . . . applicable
only to a limited territory, such as the District of Columbia, or an
"1147insular possession ....
Hampton seems to be the first case in which the Court stated that a
difference may exist in the equal protection standards applied to the
government and to the states, 48 although Justice Harlan, dissenting in
Shapiro, previously mentioned that possibility. 149 According to Hamp-
ton, however, the different, less stringent standard would apply to
federal legislation only when "an overriding national interest" is in-
volved.150 Whether the Court has always followed that directive, and
whether that directive is limited to alienage cases, is difficult to ascer-
tain because equal protection cases in each instance turn on compli-
cated legislative facts. A 1981 case, Schweiker v. Wilson, illustrates
the Court's traditional conceit, i.e., that equal protection tests and
principles of scrutiny remain the same under the fifth and the four-
teenth amendments: "This Court repeatedly has held that the Fifth
Amendment imposes on the Federal Government the same standard
required of state legislation by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 5' Schweiker, however, upheld in a five to
four decision a section of the Social Security Act that in effect denied
federal "comfort money" to certain residents of public mental institu-
tions. Congress had excluded from the Supplemental Security Income
144. Id. at 100 n.17.
145. Id. at 100 (emphasis added).




149. Justice Harlan rejected, however, the need to resolve the problem at that time: "In the
circumstances of this case, I do not believe myself obliged to explore whether there may be any
differences in the scope of the protection afforded by the two provisions." Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 658 n.3 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
150. 426 U.S. at 100.
151. 450 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (1981).
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program (SSI) those needy and disabled persons who were inmates of
public institutions; it then made an exception to the exclusion and
granted reduced comfort money (not over $300 per annum) to eligible
persons in public facilities that received Medicaid funds. As the Medi-
caid program does not include persons from twenty-one to sixty-four
in public mental institutions, those persons were denied the $25 or so
per month under the SSI program. The majority applied a rational
basis test to the facts, holding inter alia that the mentally ill as a class
had been only indirectly deprived and declining to "intimate [any]
view as to what standard of review applies to legislation expressly
classifying the mentally ill as a discrete group."1 52 The district court
had held the mentally ill to constitute a suspect classification. 53
The holding in Schweiker seems to herald a loosening of the stand-
ards applied to the government when "national interests" are "over-
riding," in consonance with Hampton. If the national interest requires
keeping international obligations, then the relevant human rights
norms that protect the mentally ill and that can be found in external
sources of law necessarily would be part of the analysis of overriding
national interest. Perhaps the emerging norms would help define the
minimum standards of human dignity that, when burdened, would
result in heightened scrutiny. However, loss of a comfort benefit
scarcely appears to burden those standards, even if the Court had
found the mentally ill plaintiffs in Schweiker to have been express
targets of the potentially unconstitutional legislation.
In any event, both Schweiker (1981) and United States Railroad
Retirement Board v. Fritz (1980) are part of a trend toward showing
great deference to the legislative branch. "Where, as here, there are
plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end.
'1 54
Justice Rehnquist went on in Railroad Retirement Board to cite Flem-
ming v. Nestor 5 for the proposition that "it is, of course, 'constitu-
tionally irrelevant' whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legisla-
tive decision ... because this Court has never insisted that a
legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.' ' 56 Justice
Brennan's dissent in Railroad Retirement Board warned that "the
mode of analysis employed by the Court . . . virtually immunizes
152. Id. at 231 n.13.
153. Sterling v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046, 1053 (N.D. Ill. 1979), rev'd sub nor. Schweiker v.
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981). The district court held that Congress's mental health classification
constituted a suspect classification that was entitled to intermediate level scrutiny upon an equal
protection challenge. 478 F. Supp. at 1053.
154. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
155. 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960).
156. 449 U.S. at 179.
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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
social and economic legislative classifications from judicial review."' 57
The Schweiker majority noted along this line that "[t]his Court has
granted a 'strong presumption of constitutionality' to legislation con-
ferring monetary benefits."''15  Were the Court to consider external
sources of human rights norms, it would at least have introduced a
framework for review in difficult questions, even if positive norms
cannot be established.
Deference to legislative decision without inquiry about reasonable-
ness has created a new focus of debate that centers on the extent to
which congressional "intent" must be actual. In Railroad Retirement
Board, Justice Brennan maintained in dissent that the actual legisla-
tive purpose must be identifiable.15 Justice Rehnquist declared in his
opinion for the Court that "we have historically assumed that Con-
gress intended what it enacted."'' 0 Justice Stevens, concurring, stated
that the purpose must be something more than merely plausible, but
not necessarily the actual purpose, it being sufficient that the purpose
be legitimate such that "we may reasonably presume [it] to have
motivated an impartial legislature. '"161
The deferential rational basis test seems to be the method by which
the Court at present reviews federal welfare legislation. 6 2 Efforts are
made to avoid finding suspect classes, and great deference is shown to
the legislature, whose intent may even be presumed or supplied post
hoc (although this attempt at extending the rational basis test is pres-
ently subject to lively debate in the Court). 6 3 Since the rational basis
variety of review in equal protection cases is similar to the test for
valid legislation in due process cases, it is tempting to conclude that
because the fifth amendment contains only a due process clause, the
relationship of reasonable means to legitimate ends so characteristic of
due process analysis also serves the equal protection component of the
fifth amendment, except when specific and invidious discrimination
of a suspect class is present. Otherwise, the textual absence of the
equal protection clause might reinforce the use of the rational basis
test in scrutinizing federal legislation to the detriment of higher levels
157. Id. at 183 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 238 (1981) (citations omitted).
159. 449 U.S. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975)).
160. Id. at 179. Justice Brennan dismissed this declaration as tautological. Id. at 186.
161. Id. at 180-81 (Stevens, J., concurring).
162. See, e.g., Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (Court applied rational basis test to
uphold provision of Social Security Act denying "mother's insurance benefits" to unwed mothers
and engaged in a general discussion of welfare cases since the 1930's).
163. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
of equal protection scrutiny. This argument suggests that universal
human rights norms offer a principled basis for heightened scrutiny to
avoid conflict with responsibilities under international law, and that
this analysis similarly informs the equal protection clause. Applying
due process concepts in fifth amendment equal protection cases was
quite possibly what the Bolling Court meant all along, without intro-
ducing the levels of scrutiny. If human rights norms can be introduced
as valid external law for the purpose of construing ambiguities to
avoid conflict with international law, then a stricter standard of
scrutiny would be available in cases presenting the proper question.
The question of what external sources the federal courts could or
should invoke in fifth amendment equal protection cases is an interes-
ing one, especially when the exact role of the usual domestic sources-
text, precedent, legislative history and legislative intent-is the object
of heated debate. 64 Suspect classes, formed on the basis of race,
alienage, sex and illegitimacy, inter alia, are protected in many inter-
national instruments, and rights have been recognized in members of
those classes. 6 5 Modern constitutions contain lengthy references to
them also: for example, the 1978 Spanish constitution, and subse-
quently the Civil Code and social security laws have eliminated to a
large extent the former discrimination against illegitimate off-
spring. 66 Modern African constitutions contain interesting reflections
on "racist" speech, and the corresponding penal codes criminalize
racial slurs and insults.1R7 While many international instruments hold
that the right to leave one's own country is a fundamental right, the
right of international travel in this country has been held to constitute
part of fifth amendment liberty and is susceptible to being curtailed
by Congress through due process of law. 6 8 Our federal courts could
and should use international and comparative law sources to ascertain
"modern" standards to fill any gaps in our domestic jurisprudence. 69
164. Id.
165. See generally R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(1973); HUMAN RIGHITS, supra note 79.
166. CONST. art. 39.2, 39.3 (Spain); Codigo Civil art. 108 (Spain).
167. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD preamble (1972 ANNUAIRE OFFICIEL
Du TCHAD) ("Any manifestation or propaganda of an ethnic character shall be punished by
law"); LA CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE POPULAIRE DU CONGO art. 12 (People's Republic of
the Congo) (Ordonnance 40/69 du 31 decembre 1969) ("any propaganda of a racist or regionalist
character shall be punished by the law"); CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE GABONAISE art. 1, cl.
8 (Republic of Gabon); CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE COTE D'IvoIRE art. 6 (Ivory Coast).
The above constitutions appear in English translation in 1 A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF
NATIONS (4th ed. 1974).
168. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306-07 (1981); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4
n.6 (1979), and cases cited therein.
169. Two courts have done so in interpreting state constitutions in cases involving prisoners'
rights. See Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9, 1192-93 (D. Conn. 1980) (court
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While the results of equal protection analysis may differ, even using
external sources, the anomaly will have been avoided in reviewing
state and federal action, and a way to limit judicial deference to the
national political branches will have been found.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The tradition of using external sources to interpret the Constitution
is very strong in the United States. That tradition reflects both natural
law, in which concepts such as reasonableness, experience, custom
and universal principles are used as guides to clarify constitutional
ambiguities, and positivism, in which judicial activism must be
grounded in text since non-textual interpretations lack legitimacy.
The modern strains of the struggle between natural law and positiv-
ism are as powerfully expressed today as they were when Story, Pound
and Llewellyn were arguing them in different forms.
1 70
The contemporary debate, however, is provincial rather than uni-
versal, for the intellectual assumptions that seem to be at work within
the United States resist (and even consciously reject) an international
context for judicial decision. But world-wide forces are as much at
work in our polity today as were the domestic forces of frontier
expansion, industrial revolution and depression during earlier periods
of constitutional development. The curiosity is how, in the over-
whelming explosion of cases and technical materials, our best minds
have focused on inner coherence with little reflection on the connec-
tions between public order and the world of which we are a part. The
responsibilities of those in universities, the American Law Institute,
and the bench and bar make it imperative that we not turn com-
pletely inward in judicial attitude in ways that deny the rich tradi-
tions of the rule of law beyond our borders.
This Article, after presenting some of the paradoxes and contradic-
tions arising from an interconnected world struggling for human dig-
nity, and after outlining current challenges to the rule of law, offers a
technical analysis and recommendation of a principled way by which
new experience may be reflected in due process and equal protection
cited numerous standards to evaluate standards of decency and to "flesh out" eighth amendment
jurisprudence); Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1982) (male inmates objected to
body searches by female personnel; court referred to international standards for treatment of
prisoners).
170. In a compelling recent argument for using modern natural law to overcome "internal or
external" skepticism about judicial decisions, Ronald Dworkin's Dunwody Distinguished Lecture
in Law at the University of Florida defends the naturalist tradition amidst the ongoing debate.
Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982).
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decisions without the dangers of unfettered judicial activism. It draws
on the long tradition of using external sources to inform constitutional
interpretation in these cases.
Human rights norms emerging in positive international law can be
used to inform constitutional interpretation about the contemporary
meaning of due process and equal protection. I have focused on the
discrete and insular minorities-children of illegal aliens, undocu-
mented aliens in prison, and aliens subject to discriminating state and
national legislation-as well as some anomalies. While other minori-
ties among us might make use of similar arguments, my focus has been
narrower. I believe the principles are the same whenever the cases
present the proper questions. 171
I do not develop the case for using external sources of law in
general, but only as they come from the general category of positive
international law and a specific subcategory of emerging human
rights law.172 I offer the following criteria for use by the federal courts
when they face the need to link the judicial process to the protection of
basic rights in a changing world:
1. In cases involving constitutional protection for aliens or other
special groups under the due process clause, a court may use fundamen-
tal human rights norms established by traditional external sources of
customary international law to help fill lacunae or to provide a context
for interpretation.
2. In determining the constitutional validity of legislation that dis-
criminates against unprotected aliens or other persons under the equal
protection clause, the same fundamental human rights norms may be
used to support a stricter standard of scrutiny for the classification than
that offered by the rational basis test. This use should avoid conflict
between democratic theory and the universal standards of the interna-
tional community.
3. The anomaly of different standards of scrutiny of state legislation
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and of
national legislation under the equal protection component of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment may be reconciled by use of
fundamental human rights norms.
These three guides to constitutional interpretation will allow the
judiciary to use a narrow category of external sources of law to inform
our own democratic majority of the meaning of fundamental rights on
171. See HUMAN RiGnTS, supra note 79, at 773.
172. Human Rights offers a useful and comprehensive understanding of the international law
of human dignity. Id.
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a more universal scale. Within this global context, perhaps we may




173. See E. BODENHIIMER, supra note 1, at 295:
The interpretive nihilism to which a radically conceived legal positivism may easily
lead makes a theory of the nonformal sources of the law not only desirable but
imperative. We know today that the positive system established by the state is inescap-
ably incomplete, fragmentary, and full of ambiguities. These defects must be overcome
by resorting to ideas, principles, and standards which are presumably not as well
articulated as the formalized source materials of the law, but which nevertheless give
some degree of normative direction to the findings of the courts. In the absence of a
theory of the nonformal sources, nothing remains outside the boundaries of fixed,
positive precepts but the arbitrariness of the individual judge.
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